A general overview of the problem of universals is indeed necessary to support a new theory worthy of consideration. If the ontological status of universals is to be investigated and questioned, it is useful to place this problem into a workable context. This pragmatic attitude in philosophy, a tendency to place a problem into a workable context might be typically labeled as an American characteristic, which was influenced from both the East and the West. This researcher is a biased towards the Eleatic, Peripatetic, and Neoplatonic Schools appreciated also are the Buddhist, Taoist, and Indian tenets. Unfortunately, only a little from the East's rich intellectual heritage will be included in this paper. Instead, the time and the setting of the controversy is presented here as it was in medieval Western European. In order to put some of the important contributors of the problem of universals into an easily grasped and clear perspective, two timelines are supplied and can be seen in the Appendices D and E. Referring to the timelines helps bring the various countries and persons involved into one chronological perspective. These timelines show an unfortunate Eurocentric/American bias because simply because the author is not familiar with Arabic, African, Oceanic, and South American history. Thus, even though universals are considered thoroughly in other traditions, this paper narrows itself to the western treatments of universals. The paper's value will come from its focus upon the unique "expressions" or crucial "keystones" upon which all serious Western philosophy is supported: universals and their assertion(s) ontologically. The ontological status of what is termed a "universal" determines the outcome, attitude, concepts, beliefs, and actions of ordinary people and philosophers alike. This is the reason for this paper and its importance.
The legacy of learning, the tradition of education that comes from the medieval West brings with it a burden which is the very problem I wish to discuss. The tradition of learning that was inherited in the West had the problem of universals carried inside of it like a kernel holds a seed. The problem of universals is interesting because it can be traced through the many great lands, teachers, and academic centers. The various historical paths that were traveled in an attempt to find an explanation of universals easily circumambulates the world of ideas.
Eastern philosophy's input is important and influential (i.e. Transcendentalism in America) and the erudition of the East beckons as strongly as that from the West. The treatment of universals is as crucial for the East as it is for the West. We must remember this pressing problem has its own full development in the Orient.⁴ Instead of the theme of universals, more generally it can be said that the East and the West have given birth to the perennial philosophy⁵, which one could say is the quintessence of the Universal. But whether one spells the word "universal" with a capital "u" or not does not detract from how important the subject is. The treatment of universals is multicultural and looking into every world culture one finds intellectual heroes who have wrestled with this Titan in one form or another. Each has his indelible stamp on philosophy each has his own distinctive interpretation of universals. Yet, it should be remembered that from a strictly philosophical perspective, the ontological status of universals is of primary importance, not the holder of any particular view regarding universals.

The problem of universals survives in the West from Greece by Theophrastus, the leader of the Peripatetic School, who had Aristotle and Plato studied by his pupils. From there its legacy went from Alexander of Aphrodisias (of Athens) to the Roman Empire with Boethius⁶ under the Gothic King Theodoric. It continued living in what is now called France because of Alcuin, Master of the Palace School under Charlemagne. Johannes Scotus Eriugena, who continued the school under Charles the Bald, further conveyed the problem of universals to Abelard also in "France": finally it went to Germany with Ockham, an Oxford scholar who fled from Church authorities. To these men we are indebted. Through them we have the works of great philosophers still with us.
The subject of universals changes drastically through history. How it varies so acutely is evident in the responses philosophers give to the subject of universals. Plato believes universals to be a general word naming an entity; Aristotle looks for recurring identities, and denies that universals are things with an existence and reality independent of constituent individuals⁷; Locke searches for selected identities; Hume looks for resemblances. Wittgenstein searches for varying and overlapping resemblances and recognizes that it is a vain servitude to a theory that insists on trying to find a commonalty to a whole range of overlaps. How varied the answers! These are only some of the views from noteworthy philosophers. It comprises an extremely general overview of proposed solutions to the problem of universals. These proposed solutions orientate us to the problem of universals as a legend helps one use a map. Let us travel some of the intellectual landscape. Let us look at proposed solutions.
One may follow this path textually. The issue of universals is carried like a torch through Plato's Parmenides, Aristotle's Metaphysics, Plotinus's Enneads, Porphyry's Isagoge, Boethius's translation and commentaries of the Isagoge, Abelard's Glosses On Porphyry, Duns Scotus's Opus Oxonnienese, Questions On Metaphysics and Super Universalia Porphyryi, and finally to William of Ockham's Golden Exposition in the medieval era. These texts show the problem was worthy, in different eras, of the attention of great minds. What are the conceptual components of the problem of universals and how was it expressed by these thinkers?

If all learning is should end in a humble type of "learned ignorance", as a thesis can present, what better start is there then with our barefooted friend, Socrates? And what better source and example is there to be found than in a young Socrates fiercely arguing with the elderly Parmenides about the notion of universals?⁸
The gist of their argument concerning universals is as follows: a general term for a single pattern or form is applied to particulars. The individuals are distinct from one another. Yet one form is found in all of them. An example of this could be a general term like Latvian. A Latvian could refer to either an individual person i.e., from Riga, or it could refer to all people coming from a specific area on the Baltic Sea. The dilemma arises as to how the form (all that is essential to being Latvian) can be single and individual and still be in several distinct individuals simultaneously (Latvians). Either the form is as often divided as there are individuals, or individuals are not distinct. To be Latvian is either to merely manifest the Latvian culture, or being Latvian is to be an individual born from a Latvian family, or in Latvia between specific years, or to be granted citizenship.. None of these are exactly correct. It is a dilemma one path of thinking destroys the form or pattern or essence, the other alternative denies the plurality of similar or resembling individuals. To deny there is no Latvian nature or character is as absurd as to say all residing in Latvia are Latvians. This dilemma is found commonly throughout philosophy, and its objection relies on logic's principle of noncontradiction. This particular objection to the theory of forms is later exploited by Aristotle,⁹ Boethius, and Abelard. This criticism, or objection to Platonism, is the beginning of the problem of universals in the West. As a beginning it has the freshness of a quest in it, yet lacks the detailed, rigorous, disciplined thinking that later scrutiny of universals supplies. Plato's means to the true, good, and beautiful is like an art. His nascent theory of universals soon had a rival theory. Aristotle, known for his "scientific" style of thinking, forms another view in his Organon. He denies that universals are things with an existence and reality independent of constituent individuals.¹⁰
Alexander of Aphrodisias adds clarity to the problem of universals, and he probably had the most long-ranging influence upon the problem. According to him, the form is what makes "this" matter (identifiable piece) what it is, but "this" is contingent upon whether the form is a generic universal. As A.C. Lloyd carefully put it "...he [Alexander of Aphrodisias] emphasized elements in Aristotle's not always unambiguous account..." Consequently, Mr.Lloyd reports that because of Alexander of Aphrodisias, "unqualified priority" is given to"particular substance" and to "universals only as concepts". Universals as concepts are for him "acts of intellect". As the intellect is aware of itself, it is univocal with the intellect Aristotle says "comes from the outside", eternally thinking itself - God. The intellect, the highest or part of the soul, exists as a separate form and was identified with the "active" intellect. The active intellect supports no "individual" immortality. No other third, intermediate, entity such as an individual immortal soul could exist unless it subsists in a genus. Such a "heresy" was later not tolerated by the Christian Church. The advantages of these theories and beliefs - some developed by Alexander of Aphrodisias - supply further support for Scholastic criticism of Plato.¹¹
From Plotinus comes the birth of Neoplatonism. The Enneads, a series of his lectures, come to us through his pupil, Porphyry. Relying on E.R. Dodds, we see that Plotinus was accused of plagiarizing Numenius, the second century Pythagorean. Numenius's works were read in Plotinus's school but there is no direct proof that actual plagiarizing existed.¹² But without question the theoretical basis of his philosophy comes from Numenius who posits that universals are more than mere concepts, and asserts the indistinguishable identity of the soul with its divine Grounds ( archai). Every soul contains, in some sense, "...the intelligible World, gods and daemons, the Good, and all the prior kinds Being".¹³ Thus Neoplatonism can be encapsulated as, "We can know the unknowable, because in our deepest ground we are the unknowable".¹⁴ These doctrinal views entwine the medieval era like a vine's tendrils. They are the distinctly Platonic approach to reality, one usually characterized and labeled as mysticism.
For Plotinus mystical union is not a substitute for necessary intellectual effort.¹⁵ Mystical union is the crown and goal for such effort. The intellectual means to mystical union upon which he relies are the three traditional methods mentioned by Albinus a century before: the way of eminence (e.g. Plato's Symposium ); the way of analogy; (Plato's Sun and Good analogy); and the way of negation; (perhaps a Pythagorean means). Further Plotinus asserts that the ultimate attributes of Reality are values,¹⁶ and that no Being exists in the Absolute. "The One" is the negation of all number.¹⁷ As we will see, these specific assertions will come into play later...
Criticisms of Platonism continue with the Neoplatonic philosopher, Porphyry. We see the development of these criticisms in later Abelard's treatment of universals in his Glosses On Porphyry, and in Ockham's analysis of Porphyry in his Golden Exposition which in turn criticize Porphyry.¹⁸ It is Porphyry, the disciple of Plotinus who first poses the problem of universals in his Isagoge. The Isagoge, an introduction to Aristotle's Categories, has Porphyry's analysis of Aristotle's distinction between substance and accident in the terms of five predicables. From this analysis, using the five predicables, he gave to posterity the criterion for an exhaustive (philosophical) definition. Definitions and their criteria are exploited later in this paper, but to build an argument for my thesis, I will continue a moment upon Porphyry's use of predicables.

These five predicables genus, species, differentia (distinctive characteristic), property (peculiar and permanent attribute), and accident (that which can be present or absent without basic substance the being altered or destroyed) all assist one in defining or indicating the essence of a "thing."¹⁹ An important point to remember is that he added species to the criterion, regarding it logically equivalent to property, genus, and accident. Species in this sense is an individual qua individual, not as a part. Species, because of this distinction, made it necessary for there to be some principle of individualism "...whereby the primary subject of predication could be distinguished formally, and essentially, from the species, just as the species is distinguished from its proximate genus by the essential differentia". Thus a sixth predicable, the "individual", becomes necessary; it appears later in two independent sources ( Abelard and Avicenna) and it leaves the primary subject of predication indeterminate with respect to individuality and universality - as appears later in Duns Scotus.²⁰
Along with this inherent need for the sixth predicable of "individual," the problem of universals inherits an interesting systemic change. This important change is a reversal of the Aristotelian order of priority between signification and predication, meaning and truth, things and facts. Porphyry restores the primacy of dialectic that Plato gave to it. E.A. Moody describes this change:

Porphyry insisted that Aristotle's analysis of modes of signification could only be understood in light of his analysis of the ways in which one term can be related to another in predication. Thus he reversed the Aristotelian order, bringing the very instrument of Aristotle's criticism of Plato into service of platonic dialectic.²¹

Porphyry's use of predicables as an introduction to Aristotle's Categories Moody describes as no more than a "masterstroke". Porphyry supplies us a rich vocabulary and system of classification which endures. Whenever the specific is distinguished from the general, or the substance of a thing from its accidental properties, Porphyry's sphere of influence is still felt and known.
Porphyry taught his readers to distinguish between predicables answering substance questions from those answering quality questions. The former, as substance questions, answer "What is it?"; questions concerning quality answer those queries asking "What kind of thing is it?" The former address genera, species, and properties. The latter are concerned with differentia and property. For definitions, this distinction is useful. He has other relevant points still highly useful today. For instance, the maxim that the adequacy of a definition is found in its convertibility or reversibility. Also, the distinction between genus and species is relative in most cases with a single term performing both duties. A famous example is the term "man" which can refer either to humanity at large or to an individual male. Porphyry calls genera and species "names of names," a formula that medieval thinkers believed to be the epitome of nominalism.²²
In his analysis of classifications he discovers the grand question concerning a debate between Plato and Aristotle. This is the problem of universals as it was originally offered. The debate is whether genus and species qua universals are

1) rooted in the matter of sensible things that constitute them or
2) a mixture of mind and sense or
3) solely intellectual and immaterial entities.

Now that it is presented in such a historical context, we can see it in its richness and depth. Porphyry asks an important question and his question has a twofold effect upon the problem of universals: medieval logic then interprets Aristotle's Organon with a metaphysical orientation (which Aristotle's logical treatises avoid) correspondingly medieval metaphysics then discusses problems in forms borrowed from logic, and problems of logic are taken as problems of metaphysics.²³
Unlike Aristotle, Porphyry does not treat reach an opinion concerning universals qua genera and species, and takes a nondecisive position, merely content to relate the trilemma. In his Isagoge, the primer to Aristotle's logic, Porphyry resists from making any imprudent statement concerning the nature of the five predicables. In his introduction for beginners of logic he declines from addressing such "lofty" matters. He states there:

I refuse to say anything concerning genera and species whether they subsist, whether they are corporeal or incorporeal, and whether they are separated from sensible things or are placed in sensible things. For such questions are profound and require greater study.²⁴

This subject seems to be an worthy issue to take up for investigation. The fair treatment of the subject must be approached slowly, respectfully, and with precision. Porphyry's attitude of care towards the issue will and should be kept in mind as universals are considered.
In Boethius's translation and treatment of the problem of universals contained in Commentaries of Porphyry's Isagoge we see his teacher, Porphyry, placed into the pantheon of philosophers. Boethius's stance concerning Porphyry's musings are straightforward. For Boethius, universals are incorporeal not comprised of matter or occupying space. Universals are subsistent realities, not simply concepts. They do not subsist outside individuals except as Ideas in God's or our own minds.²⁵
Boethius's Commentaries supplies Abelard later on an outline to create his own answer to the problem of universals.²⁶ Abelard in turn adds a fourth part to the question about universals, making the problem of universals, at least for him, a tetralemma. He adds the question:

"Whether genera and species must refer to something or whether, if their normal referents are destroyed, these universals could consist of the meaning of the concept?"²⁷

But before getting into Abelard's treatment of the problem of universals, Boethius's Neoplatonic background ought to be explored. It was through Porphyry that strong Neoplatonic influences were conveyed to Boethius.
Porphyry's powerful Neoplatonic influences upon Scholasticism are overlooked and little recognized. But it would be incorrect to state that the Neoplatonic influences inherited by him are completely ignored. We see universals flourish in Neoplatonism with Plotinus and Iamblicus in the second century, with Boethius in later part of the fifth century, with Pseudo-Dionysius in the sixth, and through the eighth century with the wise John Scotus of Eriugena.
Looking at the second century ones sees a general tendency towards introvertive mystical theory.²⁸ Thus Proclus's influential book, The Elements of Theology , traces its origin definitely to Iamblicean influences. In Iamblicus there is a fresh new direction of thought. Not only do we trace the dialectical principles and the "many-individual" doctrines in Iamblicus, but to him and not to Proclus belongs, so E.R. Dodds writes, the reproach or honor of being called the first scholastic.²⁹ One important doctrine given a century later by Iamblicus and Proclus is the multiplication of entities. Both justify the multiplication of entities in their philosophies by reference to the 'law of mean terms', where if A B and not A not B, then they can only be continuous by an intermediate term A not B or B not A.. Proclus saves the unity of his system or reconciles conflicting systems by this law (used by Iamblicus) where that 'all things are in all things, but each in according to its nature'.³⁰
Iamblicus himself is typified as a mystagogue, thaumaturgist, and priestly philosopher, as was the neopagan Proclus. But for Plotinus and Porphyry the priestly school is not put first, instead, philosophy is. Iamblicus believes that priestly arts or theurgic virtues supplies a way to salvation. Iamblicus, attracted by his character and environment to gnostic and magical practices, describes these practices as theurgic virtues he placed these above virtues of the intellect.
His way involves ritualistic magic that relies upon the Chaldean Oracles, thus Iamblicus believes the way to salvation is not through the Plotinian theoria but through theurgia. E.R. Dodds reports that Iamblicus said:

It is not thought that links the theurgist to the gods: else what should hinder the theoretical philosopher from enjoying theurgic union with them? This case is not so. Theurgic union is attained only by the perfective operation of unspeakable acts correctly performed, acts which are beyond all understanding and by the power of unutterable symbols which are intelligible to the gods.³¹

Iamblicus holds a doctrine of "not through thought but through deed." With Iamblicus the character of the Neoplatonic School takes on some new aspects, which will not be detailed here, but instead the spotlight will go on to the most influential of the Neoplatonists, Proclus.
In The Elements of Theology Proclus contributes a purely academic and theoretical work which he divides into two parts. The first part (props. 1 to 112) introduces general metaphysical antitheses. The second part pertains to the relationship each of these antitheses have to each other, both dyadically and in different orders and/or grades of reality.³² He talks of the grades of reality as determined by type of emanation.
The doctrine of emanation, a major cornerstone to Neoplatonic thought, is exemplified Proclus's The Elements Of Theology . " Every effort remains in its cause, proceeds from it, and reverts upon it."³³ This type of doctrine averts most attempts to discredit Neoplatonism, as discussed earlier with Iamblicus and his doctrine of multiplication of entities. The Elements of Theology is the main source for Christian doctrine albeit that Pseudo-Dionysius fraudulently disguises the work - with the proper Christian terminology. He then takes Proclus's tenets and offers them as authentically Christian. The Pope in 649 AD holds the work in such high esteem that he brings a question concerning them to a Lateran Council. Pseudo-Dionysius, perfectly echoing Proclus, then has a succession of commentaries done of his works by Eriugena (clumsily in 858 AD), Hugh of St. Victor, Albertus Magnus, and Robert Grossetesse.³⁴ So we see a strong chain before us linking Boethius, Plotinus, Iamblicus, Proclus, and Pseudo-Dionysius. Their inherent and inherited systems of thought, their doctrines, structures, beliefs, and theories come from Neoplatonism and imbue the whole medieval era with its character.
Boethius not only carries the tradition of Neoplatonism, but he also comments on Aristotle³⁵ and on Porphry's treatment of Aristotle. He translated these works and was held in high esteem for several hundred years because his writings were in turn used as texts.³⁶ He carries these tendencies from Porphyry as seen in his classification of things-that-are into two pairs: the universal (genera or species) and particulars (individuals); the substantial and the accidental. Looking at the following diagram one sees the possible combination of pairs:

Boethius unabashedly borrows the Greek term asystaton ³⁷ because in Latin no term existed in his time to express the concept that it is impossible for there to be a substantial accident or universal particular. Boethius writes in the typical scholastic fashion, trying to preserve assumptions held in biblical sources yet exercising logical discernment. An example of this is in his explanation of eternity and time. He writes, 'the passing Now makes time, the standing Now makes eternity'.³⁸ Such a style or manner of expression can maintain a dualism that implies a transcendence.³⁹ This theme of dualism implying transcendence continues strongly within the works of Pseudo-Dionysius and Eriugena, also because of their Neoplatonic heritage.
As for Pseudo Dionysius's fraudulent work of Proclus, he has an ubiquitous influence. He takes Proclus's philosophy and by simply "...dressing his philosophy in Christian draperies and passing it off as the work of a convert of Paul." Not only do his works escape the ban of heresy, but they are read and revered, having the same authority as Augustine.⁴⁰
The mystical element in medieval thought is most prominently seen in this sixth century mystical theologian, Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite. He synthesized Neoplatonic elements to create the Christian doctrine as it is known today. Celestial Hierarchy, Ecclesiastical Hierarchy, On Divine Names, and Mystical Theology are his more known works and various lesser important letters remain too.
One recognizes pantheistic elements in his language and description of God as an emanating and permeating force throughout the world. God is absolutely incomprehensible for Dionysius, making both an affirmative and negative theology impossible. This led him to develop his particular philosophy whereby God is approached by learned ignorance. This "learned ignorance" is seen in the Socratic dictum of knowing one's inherent ignorance. This leads one inevitably to the recognition that the more one knows, the more one knows how much more there is to learn, and how little one really knows.
In the Pseudo-Dionysian view, one is to approach God by means of a symbolic or superlative theology. The universe is a symbolic manifestation of God. Thus cosmology is symbolism, and the dictum "As Above, So Below" means that the celestial hierarchy is to the ecclesiastical hierarchy as heaven is to the Christian sacraments. This one-to-one correspondence is, according to Dionysius, not two distinct things merely existing at the same time. This correspondence is actually an identity, an aspect of the One, God. Since everything is an emanation of God, everything is a symbol or divine reminder of sorts.
Being is transcended by divine nature God is paradoxically and utterly transcendent and immanent. This paradox comes from Dionysius's theology which comes in two forms: affirmative and negative. His affirmative theology concentrates on divine causality, knowing God through various manifestations, causally linked from unity to ideas to forms, to symbols and finally to the sensible world. Conversely this negative theology retraces the route; beings return to (divine) unity. As God emanates into numerous divisions, more names or symbols are needed for these particular entities - each being a manifestation of God. They way to unity with God is through contemplation and a self-knowledge, in terms of an unknowing (agnosia) that ascends through intellect to a perfection outside the ability of intellect and then to "beyond being." All of these ideas are Neoplatonic, typical of the era.

Eriugena
In the last section we saw how the Neoplatonic views are carried through the medieval era, with the doctrine of emanation being one continuous thread connecting them all. Miraculously, these doctrines lived, "emanating" from the early second century through and up to the end of the ninth by the translator of Pseudo-Dionysius, Johannes Scotus Eriugena. Eriugena holds a strange place in the history of ideas. He was involved in early debates concerning predestination and carried the Neoplatonic tradition forward. Knowing both Greek and Latin, he had the important role for the western churches in transmitting what was then believed to be the work of the convert of Paul in Athens, Dionysius. Eriugena calls the Absolute nihil (as Plotinus would have done had he communicated in Latin); he delineates modes of being and nonbeing; and he bequeaths the Neoplatonic tradition to posterity through his translation of Pseudo-Dionysius.⁴¹
Since he follows Plotinus in denying Being to the Absolute, he also states that Being is a defect since it separates the superessential Good. What pertains to the problem of universals, besides his Neoplatonic influence upon the scholastics, is his doctrine that knowledge is the essence of all things and is only that which is in the mind of God. He holds that all that we know is a theophany: all that we know is a manifestation of the hidden, an affirmation of negation, an utterance of the unutterable, access to the inaccessible, an understanding of the unintelligible, an essence of the superessential and a definition of the infinite.⁴²
Besides this paradox of opposites in union, Eriugena makes a noteworthy philosophical distinction I wish to bring to attention, the distinction between quantum and quale. He asserts that body is not a quality, being (ousia) but a quantum, and color is not a quality of being (ousia) but a quale in a quantum.⁴³ This statement lightly touches the subject of universals, but will have a role later in this paper. Now we move to Abelard's philosophy and the to heart of the controversy.

Abelard
Abelard touches the core of the controversy because he utilizes the original objection brought up in the Parmenides and creates a novel solution. His nominalism is not without difficulties but it has strong points and valid arguments. Remembering that Abelard asserts that faith comes not by force but by reason is important for understanding the priority he gives to faith over reason. One should not believe in human reason alone to have faith but instead one should also rely on divine authority. To not understand that in which one has faith is to be neglectful.⁴⁴
His nominalistic solution to the problem of universals denies that universals are things and affirms that they are significant words or concepts only. Abelard finds a problem in the existence of an referent outside the realm of discourse. This view results from his observation that attempts at predicating things of things ends in failure.
Abelard denies the doctrine held by William of Champeaux that there is one "material substance" in different individuals of the same type, and that these individuals are different because of their diversity of accidents. If this doctrine were true, Abelard shows that one and the same substance would have mutually inconsistent qualities. An example of this contradiction would be if plant would be present in both cacti and trees, the substance would, in such a doctrine, be both leaf bearing and not.
Afterward William of Champeaux took up the indifferentist doctrine which holds that individuals of a particular type are discrete from one another, both in that their accidents are different and also that their essences or natures are not identical. Two kings are the same indifferently. Abelard sees this as being nearer to the truth. J.R. Weinberg regards this view as a beginning of moderate realism and nominalism. A resulting problem from this doctrine comes from using identity to describe the similarity of different individuals and the unity of an individual. Another indifferentist doctrine states universals are a collection of many. Abelard explains this problem in terms of predication: universals are predicated of many, but a collection cannot be predicated, because it has no common nature with its members. If a universal is a collection, then any arbitrarily picked collection is a universal.
Abelard of Bath and Walter of Mortagne posit various states of existence. Abelard counters with an explanation that is reminiscent of Socrates and Parmenides. For him the division of an individual into several states or respects necessitates that the thing is both peculiar and common. As common, a thing is predicable of many; as a peculiar, it is predicable of itself. This entails that one and the same individual is both predicable and not predicable of another universal, and it is predicable and not predicable of itself as an individual. Abelard concludes that since all attempts to predicate things of things fail, therefore universality can be only attributed words.
The criticism that common likeness involves ascribing universality to things, Abelard evinces as untrue. An example: individual women are distinct from one another both in their individual essences and in their diversity of accidental differences. They are the same in that they are women or each is being a woman. To be is not a thing. It is in terms of the individuals themselves that Abelard explains resemblance. These individuals resemble one another not because of a common nature or shared essence, but simply in virtue of resembling one another. Which words are universal or not are determined by both resemblance of those individuals on which the universal word is imposed and the existence in consciousness of a common concept. Simplified, common concepts stand for particular things. Abelard stated universals signify things by denoting singulars among which there is a resemblance. Universal terms are corporeal with respect to things denoted, but incorporeal in respect to their manner of signifying, since they are words associated with concepts indeterminately.⁴⁵ The permanent source of signification is, for Abelard, in the common conception found in the mind. At this point it is beneficial to remember Abelard's additional question or part to the problems of universals. The question was a truncated query: whether genus and species must refer to something, or if their referents were destroyed, would these universals consist of the mere meaning of the concept.
So that logical necessity (found in logically true propositions) may be accounted for, Abelard assumes the existence of something distinct that is not thought nor physical. Since both thoughts and things are transitory, necessity cannot be located within either. Necessarily, eternally, true statements are proven by demonstrating or giving an example, but the example or demonstration is not the cause of the truth. The necessity of implication requires no absence or presence. Hence Abelard concludes that the item which is propositionally asserted is other than things or thought. Whether the necessary truth of implication is dependent upon thoughts and their contents is not possible for us to say, therefore transitory thoughts are incompatible with the eternal necessity of implication.
Abelard calls that which a proposition refers a "quasi-thing of the proposition" and absolutely is not essence. What is asserted by a proposition is not any thing. Thus any resemblance between two women is in being woman or in being human yet no thing can be designated as a unifying principle of their resemblance. He clearly evinces that the referent of a necessary and true statement cannot be thoughts or things and thus asserts a "quasi-thing" - that is not essence or substance!

Scotus
We see that Abelard contributes an original theory of meaning to complete his doctrine of universals. Now we turn to Duns Scotus to see what his theory of cognition offers and how it relates to his theory of universals. But before the manner that Duns Scotus explains things is discussed, we should examine what exists according to him.
Scotus disagrees with Averroes and posits with Avicenna that Being is the highest object of metaphysics, choosing to not subordinate physics to metaphysics. Since science does not prove its principles but begins from them, so metaphysics also has principles such as being. Being is conceived distinct because it is, without qualification, a simple unequivocal concept. Being is not added to essence and does not differ from essence, but essence and existence are formally distinct. The nature and existence are inseparable even though they differ. The formal feature for Scotus is peculiar to each individual and constitutes its individuality. This individuating trait does not imply existence of the individual. Neither generic (or common) nature nor peculiar (or individual) nature entail existence. Scotus believes being (along with "one," "things," "good," and "true") to be a transcendental term "which cannot be contained under any genus." Matter, for Scotus, is a positive entity different from the reality of form, and while form has a higher degree of reality than matter, matter exists in its own right and is distinct from form.
Scotus's doctrine of formal distinctions as detailed above supports his treatment of universals and individuation. In this doctrine some "things" differ from others really and numerically. Certain features, distinct in a thing, cannot be separated: "formalities" or "realities". Thus some "things" can be numerically and formally distinct but not really. The difference between two realities is supplied as their formal non-identity. Formal distinctions exist independent of discovery and before any operation of the mind. The "thisness" or haecceity of an individual is distinct, formally, from nature.
Scotus does treat the nature of universals and the principle of individuation. He asserts that only individuals exist and that nature has a unity that is neither one nor many. Thus "suchness" (quidity) is not universal nor particular, and for a particular "suchness" to exemplify this "suchness", some individuating principle is necessary: "thisness" or haecceity. In the last few paragraphs we looked at "thisness" (haecceity), "suchness" ( quidity), and "isness" ( perseity). These are the three main things that answer what Scotus thinks exists. Now we should turn our attention to his epistemology, the how or the method by which one can know.
For a universal to be an object of the mind, common nature is abstracted from the polymorphic, inchoate perceptions and presented to the mind as a neat universal. The only way for a universal to be possibly cognized, according to Scotus, is by an intelligible species. Active intelligence causes a form to exist within the mind and represents the object as a universal and it sees common nature in the singular thing. Essentially this could be considered his epistemology.
We saw in the last few paragraphs that Scotus has a specific metaphysics whereby Being is penultimate, and haecceity and quidity respectively are, formal and real distinctions. Further more, in his epistemology we see active intelligence has a crucial role. (This could be considered his epistemology in a nutshell.) Along with his metaphysics as reviewed above, we have a concise description of Scotus's philosophy.

Ockham
Besides Scotus, a complete, general review of the medieval contributors to the problem of universals must include Ockham. He develops further the problem...As Whitehead once commented that all philosophy is a footnote to Plato, so one could retort that all modern philosophy (discussing universals) is mere digression from original and meaningful medieval thought. Ockham is the last of the medieval masters to contribute to the problem of universals. From him the Resemblance Thesis,⁴⁶ as it is now called, originates.
Through Ockham we have the Principle of Parsimony or Ockham's Razor, which applies to human thought, coming originally from Aristotle.⁴⁷ In Ockham one sees the new turn in medieval thought, a turn to a view where nothing is affirmed without reason unless experience, revelation (scriptural authority), or self-evidence clearly evince the truth.
Ockham believes nothing universal exists extramentally in the nature of things, and that all things outside the realm of consciousness are individual or singular. He relies upon the received maxim that Being and One are mutually convertible. Whatever is one, exists whatever exists, is one. Ockham understands this "one" to mean "numerically distinct" and that all diversity and unity is numerical. Islamic, Jewish, and Christian thirteenth century medieval philosophers generally agreed that the singular thing is the primal reality. It was also generally accepted that no universal thing outside of the mind exists independently and apart from individuals. Considered in itself, a universal is neither one nor many, but only what it is, a common nature shared by more than one item. For Ockham whatever is discernible is different numerically and therefore separable at least as a possibility. Since common nature was experienced in both singular and multiple entities, it follows common nature doesn't exist except in conception.
Ockham rejects the argument for the existence of a common nature. If a universal is one existing thing in many singular existing things, either the singular or the universal could exist without the other (reductio ad absurdem ). Ockham attacks Scotus's view also. Since Scotus accepts the notion that common nature has a "less than numerical" unity and whereas a common nature of diverse individuals has a numerical unity of these individuals, Scotus is rejected by Ockham straight forwardly.
Ockham argues that if A and B are identical, whatever is assertible of A is of B. Wherever there is a distinction or non-identity, then contradictory predicates can be verified of distinct things. From this if A an B are not the same, then A is the same as A in all ways and B is not identical to A and "to be (or not be) the same as A in all ways" is verified of A and B. There are no degrees of contradictoriness contradictory predicates can not be verified of any terms unless the things for which these terms stand are distinct. Scotus's assertion, that common nature has a "less than numerical" unity and that common nature shared by diverse individuals has a numerical unity, fails.Ockham believes that the doctrine of common nature comes from three main sources. First, the wrong question is asked. "How does a common nature or universal become singular or individuated?" is misguided. Ockham asserts everything in nature is singular. He thinks the task is to explain how, the singular conscious event, a conception, can operate as a universal term. Secondly, the assumption is made (to account for resemblances) that a distinct thing, apart from the things considered, must be invoked. Ockham assets that no "third reality" ( tertium quid ) is necessary to explain resemblances. Thirdly, the inheritance from Aristotle, the doctrine of abstraction, is incorrect. For Ockham, the assertion that universal concepts arise from abstracting a common nature from observations is incorrect. The doctrine asserts that common nature can be thought apart from the individuals. Ockham counters that if A and B are one thing, and A is not distinguishable from B, and yet the intellect divides A from B, then it is impossible to think A and not B (or conversely). Therefore there is no common nature and the only realities are substances and their qualities. Qualities and substances constitute the basis for concepts.
Ockham is known as a "...thorough going realist" who "...deliberately impoverishes ontology."⁴⁸ His question concerning universals is, "Do universal terms have significations peculiar and proper to themselves?" From this we easily see that his treatment is unlike his predecessors. An examination of his epistemology shows that he had three theories of universals, one which was abandoned. He posits that the nature of universal concepts and how they arise comes either from the act of knowing itself or from a quality of the mind distinct from the act of knowing. The mind intuitively notices singular things and forms or receives in itself something similar to the thing. This similitude can serve as a sign in one's consciousness. A universal concept is appropriated to each of a set of individuals if and only if the individuals resemble one another and if the concept resembles each of the individuals. This is signification proper.
It is in Ockham's logic that we find signification treated. Terms are either mental (natural signs) or spoken and/or written (artificial) signs. Mental terms make understood that which it signifies. If a mental term signifies non-mental things, Ockham designates this in his logic as terms of first intention. Second intention terms signify concepts of the mind.
His logic also addresses suppositions which are the three types: personal, simple, and material. Personal suppositions stand for normal referents (i.e. "man is a creature"); simple suppositions stand for concepts in consciousness (i.e. "man is a species"); and material suppositions stand for common referents (i.e. "man is a word").49
For Ockham universals are concepts that stand as natural signs for the individuals they resemble. Once universal artificial terms (i.e. spoken or written) are used, it is only arbitrary choice or custom that dictates its usage. No universal concept formed from one individual of exactly resembling individuals is more appropriate than any other. A universal concept stands indifferently or confusedly for any of them. It exists from a natural operation of the mind, existing within the mind as qualities. Perception and thought produce the universal concepts. Universal concepts are natural signs. Thus in Ockham's philosophy epistemology flourishes and metaphysics - or rather ontology - is impoverished.