Before when universals were a matter of contention in violent controversies, philosophers had accepted specific views that supported their positions regarding the ultimate status of universals. These views, dogmas, and beliefs originally considered universals as hypostases. From these important premises for questions concerning the metaphysical, epistemological, axiological, ethical, and logical aspects of philosophy were determined. Both the questions and answers were, in one sense, preset by religious, social, and political forces of the day. The ultimate nature of individuals, relationships, and the universe were thought to be shaped by these supposed hypostases. From reality philosophy is derived, or so it was thought. The essential structure of reality was formulated into particular philosophies. Or at least the claim by some philosophies was that an approximation to reality was expressed. The importance of renewed investigation is justified because while not all of the medieval questions were unfounded, some of the answers were. In today's reformation of the whole problem of universals, there would be no direct influence of State, Church, or Academia upon the issue. The response would come from a serious consideration of the problem itself. Present day theories are indebted to the medieval philosophical heritage; the proposed new theory of universals is based on a thorough consideration of the classical question:

"What ultimately is a universal?"

When maple sugar water is harvested from trees, each tap yields a different amount. The maple syrup that is boiled down is only 2% of the original volume of tap water. Likewise, the process of commenting upon the works of philosophers is like gathering maple water and the analyses is like the distillation process. Continuing the analogy, we must remember that the sap collection occurs over irregular terrain. To retrieve the sap one does what one can.
As I comment upon the philosophers' views, the paths I choose to bring my sap will be 'fancy free' and allow for creative input. The writing style here shall change a bit. From the concise, exacting, serious language in the former sections, a more playful, spirited writing style will occur.
In the preceding chapter we saw various philosophical responses to the problem of universals. In a nutshell, a general term is applied to particulars. The dilemma is how can individuals remain distinct while belonging to a group because of a commonalty they share. How can a member be the same and different simultaneously?
Besides the famous Platonian versus Aristotelian philosophical battle (essence versus matter as the ontological basis of reality). I find Alexander Aphrodisias's views interesting (p. 11). While Plato uses analogy to vindicate essence, Alexander of Aphrodisias stresses the intellect and intellection. The consequences of his theory leads to the denial of an individual soul - except to the degree it participates in a genus. This question whether the self is one or many deserves more attention, but the scope of this paper does not allow a deeper inquiry. But his emphasis is placed upon intellection, the process of using the intellect. Generally an emphasis is placed by Alexander of Aphrodisias upon the epistemological element in his philosophy. For him universals are only concepts, as acts of intellect. When one is aware of one's own intellect, it is univocal with the intellect that eternally thinks itself or God. The metaphysical element, the intellect as a subject, is left as an unknown. It is the knower. This observation will be incorporated later when an analysis will be presented.
Another observation is Numenius's assertion that universals are more than mere concepts which lead him to identify the soul with its divine Ground or Being. Here we see an emphasis upon the metaphysical element, which must occur if he wishes to assert Being and the soul's identity with it. His epistemology then in turn becomes a mysticism; the means, method, and approach to reality becomes hidden or unclear.
Between the two positions, one of asserting the epistemological element and the other of asserting the metaphysical, is the Plotinian approach. Plotinus favors mystical union yet still sees intellectual effort as necessary. The paths of analogy, eminence, and negation all must be traveled to arrive at illumination. The ultimate attributes of reality are asserted to be values and that no Being existing in the Absolute is comprehended in such an illumination. "The One" he believes to be the negation of all number. As one views Plotinus from afar, his unique combination of epistemology and metaphysics is revealed. To know "the One" is as important as that "the One" is. Both epistemological and metaphysical concerns are brought to one crux or union. Granted, he does ultimately put more of an emphasis on metaphysics as seen in his assertion that "the One" or "Reality" exists.
Porphyry opens a new venue concerning universals. Definitions, which are necessary for the understanding of universals, are his addition to the problem of universals. Universals and individuals are all in one manner or another defined. If universals are to be understood, then individuals also must be considered. Strangely, individuals could be an important key to understanding universals.
What is more interesting is Porphyry's reversal of the order of priority given between signification and predication, meaning and truth, things and facts. It is in the context of the above categories that the problem of universals was first put. At first glance these issues seem to be intimately tied to the metaphysical and epistemological concerns. Crucial and influential axioms, beliefs, and philosophical positions are affected by which, if any, of the above categories one prioritized. Within the parameters of these categories one can create or can find the role of universals in reality. Later I will reintroduce these issues into consideration. Continuing with my initial observations regarding issues raised by past philosophers (relevant to universals), the Neoplatonic doctrine of "multiplication of entities" comes next.
This doctrine allows one to take my contradictory terms and find an intermediary term between them, thereby reconciling any conflicting philosophical system and saves the unity of the system. This doctrine has the potential to save any philosophy that suffers from a severe contradiction. Proclus used this doctrine, as did Iamblicus emphasizes actions over theories. For him, acts lead on to the ultimate. Since the ultimate must contain universals, we can surmise that acts must also lead to universals in his system. If I were to typify this emphasis, I would label it as a metaphysical one. No epistemological element is necessary for his goal. Instead, a hidden and mysterious perfective act correctly performed leads one to the divine.
From a philosophical view, the divine often is asserted or denied axiomatically and then a system of thought follows. For Iamblicus concepts and theories do not lead to what should be sought after. Acts alone lead to excellence.
There is another virtue in Proclus's philosophy I wish to point out. He discusses metaphysical antitheses and their relationships, orders, and grades of reality. Because Proclus states everything remains in its cause, proceeds from it and reverts upon it (which is the doctrine of emanation), we see an emphasis not on epistemology but on his metaphysics. Further one could say his ontology is his metaphysics. In Boethius we see Porphyry's tendency to classify things-that-are in pairs, but in such a way as to accept the dichotomies of substance-accident and universal-particular. For Boethius the dualism of these logical contradictories implied a transcendence. In other words, opposites can be pairs contained in one group that emphasizes a commonalty. I would suppose that two items, completely different would be common because they are so completely different. This fact of unity of opposites would also unify all individuals. In the case of individuals as being opposite of universals, their unity would be found in the fact of their existence, and not necessarily found in our perceptions of them or in how they exist (from the present spatiotemporal perspective). Such a train of thought certainly can account for any obstacles one may have in constructing or elucidating a philosophical system. When we see Boethius stating that the "standing Now" is "eternity" and the "passing Now" is "time," we have an example of a paradox placed within a philosophical system. At least I would label this particular example of both time and eternity as a paradox, while others may see these two as different aspects of one reality. But we must remember the philosophy of Boethius had a tendency to use reason as a path to happiness, as witnessed in his Consolation of Philosophy.
The philosophy of Pseudo-Dionysius developed a unique philosophy whereby the universe was interpreted to be a symbolic manifestation of God. All things, in such a view, are emanations of God. Pseudo-Dionysius believes God to be totally incomprehensible and transcendent of being. This means he stresses a metaphysics based upon an unknown hypostasis. His negative, positive, and superlative theologies are means to approach the ultimate "goal," God. His theology could be called an epistemology of sorts, approaching God in "learned ignorance."
Plotinus follows such an approach as well, but deepens the rift between the goal (the Absolute, Good, or God) and Being. Plotinus saw Being as a defect that separated the Good and therefore denied Being to the Absolute. All that exists does so in the mind of God. Knowledge, for Plotinus is theophany.
Eriugena follows Plotinus in this practice of uniting metaphysics and epistemology (in a paradox of opposites in union). He also denied an ontological basis to reality, stating that body is but a quantum and color is but a quale in a quantum as mentioned earlier.
Epistemological concerns are more emphasized in Abelard's treatment. He even places reason above faith. Faith asserts metaphysical claims, but reason is essential for epistemological needs. Abelard believed that faith should come not by force but by reason. For him universals are significant words or concepts only, and they are not things. Universals exist only within the realm of mental or verbal discourse: words. His nominalism came from an observation that a philosophy that predicates things of things is doomed for failure. The common conception is in his philosophy the permanent source of signification. So, in summary we see the views held by Abelard exemplify epistemological elements and their importance in his philosophical system.
Yet when it comes to metaphysical assertions Abelard must depend on a "quasi-thing" which is neither essence nor thought. Since the eternal necessity of implication is beyond the limited observational realm of transitory thought, his philosophy relies upon propositions and their existence as "quasi-things." His theory of meaning asserts universals have the role as "quasi-things" of propositions. His epistemology (while playing a large role) diminishes and hides the ontological elements in his philosophy. His epistemology gains clarity at the price of relying upon unclear metaphysical elements (these "quasi-things"). He seems to stress the how of knowing reality, but not the what is known.
Yet one could claim in his defense that his use of "quasi-things" are a result of the limitations of language and thought or of essence and substance. This line of thought is worthy of investigation, and it will be addressed later, but for now a concentration upon the first observations will be noted. An analysis of these observations will come at the proper time.
When Scotus is investigated, one sees his placement of Being as the highest object in metaphysics. Metaphysics is therefore not subordinated to science, nor is epistemology. Formal or real distinctions are antecedent to operations of the mind. But through an intelligible species (man) universals can be apperceived. Universal nature need not be existent nor entail existence, yet the real or formal distinctions exist a prior. Distinctions formed by operations of the mind are also, in a certain sense, Being. Thus a Möbius loop of philosophy is joined between the acts of knowing (the epistemological concerns of Scotus's philosophy) and Being (the ontological and metaphysical elements). Scotus, as a realist, gives us the opposite of the nominalist's position in his scholastic philosophy. The realists hold that objects exist independently of the mind (like universal Ideas) and nominalist's counter that universals are mere concepts or names: these are two constant tendencies reoccurring. One can see in the various philosophies these tendencies are to prioritize metaphysical (or ontological) and/or epistemological elements. Now let us turn to Ockham's nominalism and see if these tendencies continue.
In Ockham one sees an acceptance of the doctrine that the One and Being are convertible. In his philosophy the singular thing is the primal reality and no universal exists independently of the mind of individuals. An immediate reaction to these views is that the singular thing can be denied as the primal reality, that Being is not convertible to One (or vice versa) and that universals do exist independently of the mind. A more neutral reaction might query in what sense is One and Being convertible, and how the singular thing is the primal reality, and which universals exist codependently of the mind.
Another point to be made is that Ockham reduces to absurdity the notion of a common nature. A logical treatment of common nature as having numerical existence quickly entails (contra Scotus's claim of universals have a less than numerical existence) a revision of universals. If Ockham was correct in denying Scotus's view, he would also have been correct if universals are simply without numerical existence. Denying the presupposition of Scotus's view would have been just as powerful as finding his logical inconsistencies.
Since Ockham denies the existence of common nature, he attacks the doctrine of common nature in a threefold manner. He believes the question "How does common nature or universal become singular or individuated?" is misguided. Since for Ockham all things in nature occur singularly, he can attack rather straight forwardly, using the Principle of Noncontradiction from logic. He concludes that universals or common nature are conceptions. We could say his philosophy at this point takes on an epistemological overtone. The concept of the universal loses it status as an entity existing in its own right, but instead is dependent upon the process of conception.
Ockham attacks the doctrine of universals or common nature by denying the need for a third entity to explain the resemblance of two distinctly different entities. Ockham further attacks the notion of common nature by arguing against the Aristotelian doctrine of abstraction. Fighting fire with fire, Ockham uses an argument found in discussions of epistemology: abstraction is unfounded because it is impossible to separate the thought of an entity from the entity itself. Likewise it is impossible to think of one such entity without its concept. Ockham believes that there is no common nature that can exist both inside entities and outside of them. Substances and their qualities are the only realities and only they constitute the basis for concepts.
My immediate reaction to this line of reasoning is that Ockham seems to be shifting the emphasis of investigation from common nature to conception. This has the advantage that thought is accessible to any philosopher. To think of a universal as an entity apart from conception or definition acts as an assertion of the entity known. But Ockham requires no conception for resembling entities to resemble on another. They can resemble one another simply because they do! Here I agree with him on a pragmatic level. On the other hand Scotus could still be correct in asserting formal distinctions. The mind's ability to discern concepts apart from percepts lends credibility to the argument that thoughts and concepts are free from substance's influence. But this line of argument needs to be pursued later. This first-level observation is that Ockham's thorough-going realism asserts a doctrine necessitating an epistemological base. For Ockham the mind intuits and notices singular things and the resultant similitude formed in one's consciousness serves as a sign or symbol. The concept resembles the individuals (which also resemble one another).
Ockham's assertion that entities are intuited singularly could be partially correct. Individuals can exist in dyads, triads and so on. In the consciousness being is known through awareness in terms of groups also. After a certain number, the distinction of individuals ceases and the individuals become considered as a single entity. In example, any friend one has is not considered merely a collection of cells strewn together into some life form to whom one gives a name. Any friend is much more than that, thank you. But when do I notice my friend? I can notice qualities, each different from the others. Yet my friend is a singular entity. Reflecting upon "friend" as a ready universal, I can continue here looking at various options and yield some new observations.

Reflections
The modern philosopher Derrida enjoyed his deconstructionism and opened one presentation quoting Aristotle's greeting: "Friends, there is no friend!"⁵¹ In my opinion, we can conceptually construct what a universal such as "friend" is. No need exists to carve and whittle down the meaning of "friend" into absurdity. No enemy is to be found in words, concepts, and objects. Reality is neither an enemy nor a friend.
Rather than rejecting Western philosophy as Derrida seems to desire, my route is more conservative. An investigation of the medieval treatment of universals yields a different result. Why should we throw out the baby with the bath water?
As we all know, presently in the world many values and qualities are being asserted as having priority over one another. Political and military repercussions result from such beliefs, as well as religious, moral and philosophical tenants. From the myriad of answers lie some reliable and axiomatic beliefs and facts. As we shall see, universals are where we least expect them, "at home" so to speak.
In this world with its many religions and peoples, at least one absolute can be asserted. That absolute is reality itself. In a unique sense we are the basis of (or help constitute) this absolute. Likewise, our consciousness (being one entity amidst the totality of all things) has this wonderful ability to generalize and conceptualize. If any other entity, besides reality, can be asserted to simultaneously exist and be known, it is consciousness! Since consciousness cognizes this reality both in particular and in general, a direct link exists between the knower and the known. Epistemological and metaphysical claims can be made conjointly from this standpoint, providing a "common sense" appeal. Within reality universals are known and experienced, but how is one to understand them? A strong working definition seems to be supplied from the six different predicables mentioned earlier. Even though definitions have a slipperiness in their distinction between genus and species, their efficacy justifies their use. While genus and species can be mere "name of names," one could interpret them as an "index of indexes."
Upon reflection of earlier positions discussed in this paper concerning universals, they would be discussed in terms of both logic and metaphysics. Universals would not only subsist within individuals, they would constitute individuals and exist outside them - combined making a truly robust theory of universals.
To further bolster universals, the "law of mean terms" used by Iamblicus would reconcile any contraries or contradictions, if needed. (p.19) Universals could be asserted as emanations as Proclus did. But if we are to reflect upon universals, their goal or to what they lead ought to be considered. Iamblicus would have asserted that they are involved with heterodox beliefs such as magic, serving its needs. This strange observation sharpens our focus upon the diverse motives behind explanation and use of universals. Why would anyone assert some magical trait to metaphysical elements within one's philosophy?
As strange as it seems to us, one could build a case for his type of "magic" leading to a insight, practice, and then theurgic union as Iamblicus had. Universals, which Proclus asserts are involved in the goal of ultimate insight, give pure motive that lends itself to magic. Seen in its surviving ritual form as anthropologists presently study it, magic is still seen by the public as barbaric. Yet in the modern world, magic is still recognized by the Roman Catholic Church as a means to understand and control nature, through ritual and symbols. Magic, in this sense, exists in many forms. One form of such "magic" is modern science.⁵² Thus from such a view one can look at the Manhattan Project and see how experiments (rituals), equations (symbols), and many hours of work led to the atom bomb. Some of the building blocks of nature were observed, understood and then controlled or manipulated. The motives behind the use and understanding of universal laws regarding the energy and matter facilitated the creation atomic bombs and energy. Universals concerning matter and energy, mixed with the motives of that time, initiated our present day level of understanding of atomic energy.
The goal(s) behind the use of universals are an essential element behind any theory whether it be about universals or not! In this context, any individual's mind uses universal concepts as tools for understanding, and are merely created by the human mind for the need to adapt, understand, and live. The motive to use universals is purely pragmatic. The will power or motive behind the use of universals does, at least in a poetic sense, have a magic of its own. But I'm not suggesting here that some theurgic union is at hand for those delving into the nature of universals, but that the end to which universals are aimed, their teleology, must be considered. Here the saying "The truth that edifies is the truth for thee!" applies.⁵³ Motives of individuals, including this writer ought to be considered well. When I proposed above that any individual uses universal concepts as tools for understanding, and are they merely created by the human mind for the need to adapt, understand, and live - that was within a pragmatic context. I'm not stating here what universals as such are, but what motive lies behind and is entailed by such a view. In example, the understanding that universals give is asserted by Proclus to ultimately end in salvation, while Plotinus asserts the end to be insight.
The particular motives, metaphysical and epistemological concerns behind the use of universals are elements that must be contended with as well as any observations that can be made along the way. What yet could bolster a robust theory universals?
Universals existing in both the "Standing Now" and "Passing Now" would yet facilitate the claim made for universals. This would capture both senses of time, the limited and the unlimited as explicated in Kant's Critique of Pure Reason. Any single known unit of time is limited even if it is all of "time." Yet in another sense of time - the never-ending and perhaps with no beginning - there is a transcendental type labeled more correctly as "eternity." Of course there is yet another sense, one meaning outside of time completely and this too could be labeled as eternity in today's common terms. If there is an objective eternity I would assert universals as existing without end but not in a "Klein bottle" of time.
Should, must, can most universals be approached in the "learned ignorance" of Dionysius and be seen as theophanies of reality? In a sense, yes! Unless we wish to assert, looking back at that wonderful entity we all know, - "friend" - is merely a collection of cells, we have some challenges before us. To cheerfully scoff at Derrida, I would like to reply, "Friends, there are friends yet to be!"