Chapter 4 - A Heterodox Hypostasis

CHAPTER 4. A Heterodox Hypostasis: Reality As...

Section A: A Universal

Identity, self, time, universe, and infinity are all codependent of one another. All five of these items are codefinitional; that is, to limit or define one, another item is also defined, affected, or becomes limited. A complex conceptual game of rock, paper, scissors ensues. For those who focus upon the epistemological concerns, the validity of each definiens and definiendum becomes crucial. Metaphysics and ontological concerns will look at a definition in terms of characteristics and qualities. Epistemological needs will be concerned with logical or pragmatic aspects of a definition.
The process of defining the contingencies of identity, self, time, universe, and infinity in respect to each becomes a matter of assigning absolutes and variables. The formaic principle that each of these items affect one another admits to the assumption that a general characteristic applies to the group. The essence of a conglomerate, whether hetero or homogeneous, is its quale or qualia. This essence is known from its quale or qualia. When one considers the universal "friend" we know it through the various qualities that friend(s) manifest. Let's look at what is involved in doing so.
To conceptually extract property, essence, or quality from an item depends upon abstraction. In the realm of theoria and speculation, this is a high priority task. This is readily accomplished for imaginative thinkers. To apply principles strategically, to use ideas in appropriate situations is another matter altogether. Since several issues must be balanced or harmonized simultaneously, other concerns are tasked to the serious thinker: timing, goodness, truth, and other abstracts come to mind. To pragmatically bring the abstract and the concrete together can at times be almost impossible for the normal thinking individual. Even in the best of circumstances such a union can be difficult for certain topics or a system of thought. The unpredictability of unified elements, issues, and subjects within one system hinders accurate assessment for any person: an example is the game chess. The game has set, limited rules yet the variations can be almost infinite. The chess players' influences bring other unforeseen variables, thus victory is not always predictable. Something simple yet complex as a medieval game of chess can challenge people with its configuration, rules, and pieces.
It seems humanity has a love for thinking, conceptualizing, scheming, speculation, abstraction, and all sorts of higher operations of the mind. When it comes to the more challenging and important issues of metaphysics and epistemology, all of the most important things cherished - such as identity, self, community, nature, time, and universe - are involved. When it comes to universals as simple as the cherished "friend," one is willing to delve into such deep issues. After all, Derrida and Aristotle could be wrong and it would be good to either falsify, verify, or disqualify the statement that there is no friend!
Metaphysics (the study of underlying reality) and epistemology (the study of the acquisition, possibility, and process of knowledge) are greatly concentrated in the issues of identity, self, time, universe, and infinity. Metaphysics gives us its austere recognition of things as they were, are, and shall be. Epistemology bestows us the consciousness of doubt and certainty.
Both studies call for axioms and principles upon which to rely. An assertion is necessary that can not be questioned. One such entity is consciousness. But how can I assert the existence of consciousness, let alone define it, if arguments such as solipsism exist? Many arguments go down the path of denying consciousness in some form. Solipsism, as an example of this strain of thinking, can not be logically denounced.⁵⁴ Must claims exist as in Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, as part of antinomy as his work portrays? If one wants to assert that the universe is finite or infinite, either claim can be made with a logical backing, but never the twain shall meet!⁵⁵ Nor can the one attack the other's claim from a logical basis. Determinists and free-will lovers have the same encounter with one another. As one considers the antinomies Kant presents within a purely limited logical parameters (excluding Hegelian logic here), one is trapped in a dilemma. Which of the antinomies ought one to pick? Which of these antinomies is the "better"? This moment of decision is similar (if not the same) to when one wishes to either assert or deny consciousness. Coming back to solipsism, the claim that one can only be aware of one's self and its states leaves the consciousness of others out of the picture. This is a big mistake: this is tantamount to simply asserting that others besides oneself do not have consciousness. It also disallows for the existence of nascent consciousness or newly discovered consciousness in other species' minds.
Indeed, consciousness is a slippery subject at times to discuss. Subjectively, consciousness exists within the reader and writer; it exists as an objective fact also. If any entity can be asserted to exist and to be known simultaneously, it is the consciousness. Within the parameters of our minds we can know and be exactly what we are. The ontological assertion that I am concomitantly can be made with the epistemological statement I know. There is a congruence to these assertions or facts. Consequently the consciousness becomes necessary for understanding universals. The value of the mind and consciousness is also concomitant with the problem of universals; it is the individual mind whose ontological integrity evinces the realm in which universals exist.
One cannot know something without the process of knowing. Likewise, knowing cannot exist without there being something that knows and is known; knowing and being are interrelated and interpenetrating. The two exist unified in reality, and to understand one feature is to understand an aspect of the other. These two metaphysical and epistemological considerations in philosophy, could be viewed as two sides of the same coin. The monumental "I think therefore I am" in Meditations by Descartes is based upon axioms that are backed rationally. He starts from Christian assumptions such as "God would not let me be deceived" and reasons latter that his introspective observation of his own mind supplies ontological ground for his philosophy. To be ontologically "sharing" I am apt to think that observations, understanding, and practices of people in cultures unlike my own know reality as well or better than I do. Yet these people have different beliefs and ontological assertions about reality. The beliefs are varied, they can believe in gods, no gods, God, Gods, and no God. But instead of a Judeo-Christian view as Descartes espouses, I would propose that within the realm of philosophy one should use the label "reality" to encompass all unknown, known, and understood entities and nonentities. Like the Indian story about blind men around the elephant, we need to label what we understand and experience well. The best universal term denoting the group to which all universals belong would be "reality." This assumption is not based upon logic but from the observation that consciousness supplies. This important observation of a thinking, being, and the term reality together in a united philosophical axiom and principle in consciousness is the basis for what I propose here. Here it is assumed that a thinking and an existing entity - such as the reader - shares the same group in which reality itself belong. In short, the axiomatic beginning of this thesis is the moment the thinker realizes that reality, existence (both personal and other) and thinking are all interrelated and interpenetrating. As response to this claim could be the objection that I am using "reality" as the all inclusive term at one time and then "universal." While this is a good logical point, it doesn't apply here because words are used in this paragraph to denote meaning rather than demonstrate style or logical sense. Logic doesn't help one assert an axiom or create a basis for a system of thought. In a sense, the answer to Betrand Russell's famous query, "What is the set that contains all sets?" would be reality itself, in one sense being The Reality and other times being The Universal . This is paradoxically like an Ouroboros eating its own tail, but existence doesn't present itself in neat logical packet as some would like it. But in response to such people and to use a common cliché, "Such is life; they'll get over it!"
The next step after this axiomatic assertion is made is to look at reality fully. The illustration of "friend" will bridge reality and the thinker/observer here. We have this big lump of reality and thinking occurring, but like infants we have no sense of where we end and our external reality begins. A burp and thunder seem similar from such a view: "reality is breathing me" or "I am forced to breath by nature" is not differentiated from "I breathe." The subject-object distinction blurs as Piaget noted in children if it were not for a healthy sense of ego within us all.⁵⁶
Plotinus united epistemology and metaphysics whereby knowing "the One" or reality is just as important as that it exists. But how does one divide "the One" or reality from oneself? The observation made earlier that individuals and universals are to be conjointly considered for understanding comes into focus.
Knowledge for Plotinus is a theophany, but in our era a single undisputed fact and theory would be priceless. In an age where revelation has made one "politically correct" view as valid another, a solitary universal would be powerful. It would re-enforce the true, good, valid, and beautiful. Like Abelard, one should not come to belief or "faith" in a metaphysical claim by force, but by reason.
If we assert that a universal such as "friend" is only a significant word or concept as Abelard did (and not things), "words" would be the uniting factor and would comprise what a universal is. Since the word "friend" is linguistically omnipresent, this claim is strong. It is made stronger by the non-reliance upon the limited observational realm of thought or upon essence. Abelard relied upon a "quasi-things" or the eternal necessity of implication (of propositions). The role of universals as "quasi-things" implies that to be is not a thing. So "friend" would not be an object per se but a doing that is signified conceptually and through discourse. Common conceptions from the mind, giving a source of signification from words (associated with the concepts indeterminately) are how universals manifest in human discourse for Abelard. This would allow for a "quasi-thing" status for "friend" even if all thinkers ("conceivers") and referents were destroyed (if all friends were killed - as philosophers will think up to make a point).
Abelard has epistemological clarity in claiming that one can assert indeterminately a signifying word to represent a concrete singular or common concept. Universals, whose act of signification is incorporeal, denote items that are corporeal. Thus my friend is a definite singular corporeal item, my concept of him is signified in discourse as the word "friend" which was assigned indeterminately or predicated to many (as a collection). Since a thing cannot be predicated of itself (and Abelard relies on words as universal) "friend" in such a view is not a transcendental being but more of a "quasi"-being. Abelard dumps perseity ("isness") for necessity ("mustness") to build a strong theory of universals. The eternal necessity of implication (of propositions) is the principle upon which his system of thought relies. One could always look at what cost it was to the value of his particular brand of philosophy, but this unfortunately lies outside the scope of the topic of universals.
Let's look at the general points here: Abelard uses concepts, words (significations) and singulars in his theory of universals. While he allows for "quasi-things" outside the realm of discourse, the existence of a referent outside this realm becomes problematic. As when one can demonstrate the necessity of implication but not the cause of such a truth, the existence of a referent outside the realms of discourse and conception then becomes even more problematic. I can show that a truth/universal is but not what it is! It is impossible for us to say whether the necessary truth of implication (not requiring either presence nor absence) is dependent upon our thoughts and their contents because thoughts are so transitory.⁵⁷
Now what is good in Abelard's account of universals is that the act of signification is brought into focus. Symbols (words), concepts and singulars are brought together. His argument is made strong by using necessity. Finally, a "quasi-thing" that is not material, conceptual, or of essence, is affirmed. Further, no unifying principle is required for there to be common concepts of resembling individuals. Simply being friendly along with a common concept in consciousness is all that is required for a friend to exist and to be known as a friend. That which is denoted by such discourse is a "quasi-thing;" is not a mere object nor an essence.
The strong point in Abelard's account of "friend" is that isn't reliant upon objects or conceptions. A solid claim or axiom that something which neither is a concept nor a material thing is implied when common concepts are signifying singular or particular things. Here we come to Abelard's fourth part to the problem of universals, whether genus and species must refer to something, which is answered by his assertion that the item propositionally asserted is neither concept nor essence. "Friend" is asserting "friendliness" of some entity X.
Here the universal "friend" is asserted by Abelard to not be essence nor any thing – it is other – this "quasi-thing." To keep necessity within a framework of universals, an "other" must be asserted.
This is both a strength and a weakness. This non-thing – "quasi-being"– allows for an indestructible cornerstone upon which a theory of universals can be built. But its weakness lies in that "quasi-things" couldn't necessarily be distinguished form inconceivable unknowns outside the realm of discourse. Looking at our example of "friend." we see a friend could not be distinguished from strangers (and apathetic others), and non-friends couldn't be identified and known reliably.
What is good in Abelard's contribution, (his theory of meaning used to complete his doctrine of universals) is that he brings an element not considered before: signification. His answer to the question offered by Porphyry centuries before is distinct and clear, echoed later in Gödel theorem. Gödel had demonstrated, in regards to logical systems that a system has a reliance upon axioms, outside itself. But Abelard's moderate realism and/or nominalism uses identity to describe the similarity of different individuals and the unity of an individual. Identity, as a decisive factor in explaining similar individuals and singulars can be traced back to Parmenides as mentioned earlier. We can have concepts and symbols signifying "friend," but the identity of any one friend, and his or her similarity in friendliness to other friends is not thing-dependent. Where's our friend then? Signification leaves us without an essential whereby we can have "friend" on our lips or in our minds, but none are to be seen.
Boethius doesn't rely on signification; he reasons that universals can not be real nor conceptions, based upon the assumption that everything real is one or singular. Abelard also relies on the identity of singulars with that which is real to deny universals as anything other than words or significant thoughts.
In this line of argumentation presented by both, one clearly sees the concentration of the elements of concepts; symbols (signification), objects, and some other whether they be "quasi-things" as Abelard asserted or as incorporeal entities as Boethius before him posited. Boethius asserted universals not merely as concepts but as non-spatiotemporal, subsistent realities. He saw universals as not existing outside individuals except as Ideas in our own mind or in God's.
With Scotus, we find a different description of our "friend" than as Boethius would describe. Instead of an Idea within the mind, Scotus posits formal or real distinctions antecedent to operations of the mind. Transcendental terms such as "being" may have formal distinctions but they don't differ in essence, nor does their individuating trait (haecceity) imply existence. This formal distinction, peculiar to each individual and the source of its individuality, relies upon an assertion that nature has a unity that is neither one nor many. An individuating principle is necessary for Scotus to explain that a quality has a specific manifestation. Active intelligence, causing a form to exist within the mind, allows for the insight that a common nature exists in a singular thing. In Scotus the issues of quidity, perseity, and haecceity come to the foreground. Certain terms cannot be contained in any genus. These terms are transcendental. While "friend" would probably not be as lofty a term as "beauty" or "true," it would be contained in a larger genus such as "those who are loving." Further, the distinction of "friend" exists before an operation of the mind. Reality manifests itself as "friend" before we are aware of the fact, Scotus would assert.
Let's come back to some points made earlier. From Boethius we get the association that universals are non-spatiotemporal entities subsisting in the minds of people or God. Abelard asserts them to be concepts or discourse pointing to a "quasi-thing." Scotus says they exist a prior as formal distinctions. The source of universals seems to range from the purely the non-material to immaterial, with entities partially im/material in between.
If we had several blind men accurately describing an elephant-friend after having a chance to feel an elephant, would we have what they each would describe? Would we have a snake-like (trunk), tree-like (leg), leaf-like (ear) or broom-like (tail) creature? No, we would have an elephant-friend that would be best described by joining all the accurate elements.
We have different descriptions of universals which I will unite here. The various descriptions pertain to genus and species and the dilemma of how individuals can be distinct while belonging to a group whose members share a commonalty. The question is how, when and why can a general term be applied to particulars? Let's start from the two axioms of consciousness and reality. To be aware of anything, is this to be aware of a single, unified thing? If it is reality or "the One," as Plotinus would assert, it would negate all numbers as such or be transcendent of number. Scotus would assert that nature has a "less than numerical" unity, seemingly saying the same thing - that the category of "number" doesn't apply to an ultimate description of reality; number is a dividing concept delimiting one thing from another in reality. As useful as it can be, number is different than unity. The topic of unity would have its priority placed on the action of two or more entities and their union rather than their number. While it is true that Ockham saw Being and One as mutually convertible and the singular thing as the primal reality, this statement could be seen as an element of the whole truth if one were to answer the question, "In what sense is One and Being convertible?" This answer would supply us with an understanding of how the singular thing is the primal reality and which universals exist independently of the mind.
We can recall that Ockham reduces to absurdity the notion of common nature by arguing against the doctrine of abstraction, an element Aristotle prized. Just as Ockham used the doctrine of Non-Contradiction to assert that universals exist only within the mind (that observes resembling entities), this in turn entailed as revision of universals, one could assert a completely different axiom to be backed by logic and therefore bringing about another revision of universals. If Ockham was right in denying Scotus's claim that universals have a less than numerical unity, he would have been also correct if universals are simply without number and numerical existence. But the goal here is to find and assert what can ultimately be known about reality.
At least an assertion that some entity – whether it be many or one – is actually known can be made. Number is not the topic of focus here; instead, how can this entity manifest? This entity, a universal, can manifest simultaneously as a singular concept and/or a corporeal entity supported by a non-spatiotemporal "quasi-thing." If all the former philosophers were describing the same "elephant," we could have this combination of individuality, commonalty, and unity into one philosophical system where abstract entities, symbols, and objects are the characteristic manifestations of universals.
Admittedly the line of reasoning here depends upon the argument based upon analogy rather than empirical or rational evidence. But the doctrine of admissibility⁵⁸ allows us to enter even an analogy as evidence for this thesis.
When one is the knower, the metaphysical element of the intellect is left as an unknown. The knower understands the entity known, and when one knows one's own intellect, Alexander of Aphrodisias would assert that the intellect is at that moment univocal with the intellect that externally thinks itself – God. This same self-recognizing moment such as Descartes' "I think, therefore I am" is pivotal in philosophical systems.
Without yet addressing the one-many issue or paradox, one can easily assume an entity-other relationship joined by the process of observation and awareness in reality. Ideas, concepts, objects, and symbols of "friend" (or any universal) are presently before us. What other items are to be included in a theory of universals? Various philosophical systems include these issues: perseity, haecceity, quidity, necessity (Please see Appendix B). Also included are the five predicables of genus, species, differentia, property, and accident, joined by the principle of the individual. The mind, the knower, sense, the act of knowing, the known, sensible things, and the unknown are other items to be included in a theory of universals. The argument has been put into the context of individuality, commonalty, and unity. Finally I would like to offer the observation that universals are not discussed in terms of context alone. Hopefully in this paragraph we have a list of the essential elements needed to adequately describe universals. To get to this long sought-after description, let me usher in the three pillars of my thesis.
As I re-introduce the three elements of idea(l)s, symbols, and objects, let me remind the reader what is meant here by such terms. Objects are here denoting the physical, electro-chemical, material items in reality and comprise the universe as we know it. The needn't still exist in today's space-time to be denoted as having been real. Examples of these are automobiles, quarks, electrons, thunderstorms, the human body, and parakeets. Symbols are representative tools – either natural or artificial – that appear in physical or conceptual form but are not necessarily based upon physical or conceptual entities.⁵⁹ Samples of symbols are the sword Excalibur, the Holy Grail, mudras, flags, words, paintings, music, dance, songs, gestures and monuments. I write "idea(l)s" to denote two aspects of one type of entity. Ideas in the Platonic sense, denote a superessential entity or essence if not qualia or nature (as we use the term nature today). Such an idea would be discussed in any of Plato's works and is picked up by and transformed by Hegel; examples known through and in essence, the absolute, the ultimate, the good, the true, the beautiful, the one, the transcendent, and spirit. Ideals can denote goals towards which or for which one can work and such as justice, utopia, peace, heaven on earth. Ideals can denote nonmaterial entities believed to be real (or unreal but still representative of some higher truth) like bodhosatvas, saints, unicorns, Greek gods, daemons and pukas. This touches upon the teleological nature of universals as it manifests in individuals such as the reader or the writer. Ideals also denote non-material, non-conceptual, transcendental, and sometimes non-represented entities. I wish to capture both senses: "Idea" in the Platonic or even Hegelian sense is united with "ideal" as it appears in ordinary language. Thus I write the word "idea(l)" with the hopes of stretching the bounds of English a little.
If reality is a universal, then three possible manifestations occur as explicated above: idea(l)s, symbols, and objects. The augmented yin-yang symbol illustrated before becomes useful in further showing reality's various manifestations. It will help us eschew the conundrums arising from the manifestations as a person discovers and begins to understand reality.
Archetypally we have the various combinations of idea(l)s, symbols, and objects. Collectively they will be referred to as "hypostases" but not with the Christian connotation. Let us assign letters and symbols to each of the three to more readily see the combinations and relationships between each. "A" and "____"will represent "idea(l)s;" "B" and "_ _" will represent "symbol(s)," lastly "C" and "_ _ _" will represent "object(s)." Resulting is the following table:

Table I. Relationship of Ideas, Symbols, and Objects

As a note to the reader, I fill in the first top horizontal row with sample symbols just mentioned to denote column categories, but leave the horizontal column labeled with only letters. Resulting, we see each hypostasis in relationship with the other two hypostases. We also see two of the same type together, (i.e. an idea in relation to another idea as in example A-A above). At this point one could still use dichotomies as seen in the yin-yang symbols to represent the possible permutations.
Presently the universal hasn't been given quantity yet, but rather we have a symbolic representation of what the character of universal(s) is. I would like to submit that we perhaps also see the two possible characteristics of individual universals represented. Thus a unique universal could have two characteristics; in example, "country" could manifest as a map or flag (symbolically) and as the land or object itself (the example that intersects at B-C). Thus a particular universal that is an object - say "cup" or "friend" - can also be an ideal or idea (i.e. A-C) A few minutes contemplating the combinations represented above yields some interesting results.
Table I. above shows us the ways that universals start to become more complex, or how they can come into union with another universal and become a unique universal. We see substantiations for each combination from particular philosophies. The doctrine of idealism would concentrate on the intersection of A-A as seen in the Table or any combination with Aor idea(l)s in it. Nominalism would encompass the B-B or samples with B(symbols). Materialism or Objectivism in its various forms would be well represented in the C-C portion of the Table with its variations. There of course could be a complete disregard of Ockham's Razor and we could multiply entities ad infinitum claiming that Reality is some Gargantuan comprised of numberless universals strewn together. But I don't believe philosophy is in any dire straits as if we are in the belly of a whale. Nor do I believe that reality is like a blanket comprised of the woof, weave, and design of idea(l)s, symbols, and objects. There could be a characteristic of universals that is not idea(l), symbol, or object. There always is the Unknown called by many names and which no universal may represent as such. Perhaps it may be merely hinted. As Wittgenstein correctly warned, I should no longer comment upon that which I cannot speak.⁶⁰ But what will be verifiable or falsifiable about my theory is whether it explains why there are simultaneously various workable philosophies out in the world that are so seemingly contradictory of one another. Further, it should be verifiable or falsifiable whether all philosophies could be explained in a matrix that would show each of the three styles or manifestations of universals. What if the various theories of what universals are merely contraries of one another or like the three primary colors? In this light (please forgive the pun here) universals could be seen as combinatory manifestations of the three hypostases. Another table permutatiing these hypostases would result:

Table II. Combinations of Ideas, Symbols, and Objects

This table resembles the I Ching with its trigrams that were written down so long ago in China. This is the last moment we really consider each type of manifestation and its individual character here, but now we will look at each in relation to another. Universals need not exist only as individuals. They may exist as unitary sets: labeled with numbers are the unique combinations with the three distinct types of universals. Please keep your finger on this page or note its number because it will be a reference point for later consideration.

Section B: Unitary Sets

Ockham uses an emphasis upon the epistemological to support his theory of universals. Abstraction cannot exist for him because he sees that an entity cannot be both inside an observer and outside the observer; it is impossible to separate an entity from the thought of the entity, just as it is impossible to think of an entity without its concept. As noted before, Ockham's emphasis is not upon common nature but upon conception. This view allows for two items to simply resemble one another for no other reason or cause than they simply do. Thought is easily accessible to any philosopher, one doesn't need an expensive computer linked up to an Internet team of interdisciplinarians to arrive at some novel and valid point concerning universals. Conception or discourse concerning a particular universal can act as an assertion of a universal, but Ockham's stance has the strength that resembling individuals need no act of conception to simply resemble one another. Pragmatically, this accounts for strange coincidences like people who aren't familially related but look as if they are twins or siblings. It accounts for how people resemble other friends. But what this doesn't address is how Scotus could be correct in assigning formal distinctions; it doesn't address the fact a friend may indeed be one even if there is no resemblance. The mind's ability to form concepts apart from percepts seems to support the view held that thoughts and concepts are somehow free from the restraints of substance or objects. Perhaps Ockham's stance that substances and their qualities are the only realities and constitute the basis for concepts is incorrect or not completely correct. In Table II above we have a pretty good defense that Ockham was incorrect or partially correct and why.
To demonstrate a possible use of the Table above, one could simply assume a particular stance and then prove, disprove or approve any such claim or stance. If I assume that Ockham's nominalism, after a little study, should be labeled as having tendencies that are materialistic, nominalistic (symbolic), and idealistic, then I could identify his philosophy as one of the combinations numbered 1 through 6. Since the assignment of the three symbols and their groups are determined by how the Table is constructed, we see that some universals are on top of the other two. The table can be rearranged but the order of the items is not important. The Table's various representations of the three types of universals (or what I labeled the hypostases of reality) is what concerns us here. Since Ockham did profess a God's existence whose nature is transcendental (i.e. omniscient, omnipresent, omnipotent) we can choose a trigram with the "____" symbol. Because his ontology is based upon the existence of a God who creates and sustains the universe, we could choose a trigram with the "____" at the bottom. Then we have Ockham's belief that all that exists is substances and their qualities. This would give us the opportunity to place "_ _ _" second because of the reliance of qualities upon the substances (which they reflect). Finally we would have "__ __" on top indicating his nominalism. The trigram labeled #5 is what one has, after this creative assignment process. But let's look at the implications of Ockham's philosophy.
Simply put, it's limited by the prioritization of conceptualization over the other hypostases to explain universals. Conceptualization is a process upon and in which universals exist for Ockham. He has problems with the fact that in the absence of thinkers or observers and in the absence of concepts, the very things that are denoted by universals do indeed exist. Looking at the Table we can understand how Ockham went from God to a new formulation of universals via a new interpretation of the conceptualiztion process. Likewise we can see the type of philosophy that would directly be the antithesis of his philosophy found in #1 above. Here we would have something similar to Spinoza's philosophy, where Substance is the basis of reality, concepts correctly adduce (that is "extract the essence of") universals, and that ideas are the most subtle version of Substance. In this example I am more trying to show that the Table can be used as a tool for understanding the myriad of flavors that philosophies can manifest. The assignment or consignment of every distinct brand of philosophy to a specific trigram could become tedious and artificial.
But the Table allows for opposing philosophies to be represented within one schema. Idealism and materialism, the two classic philosophical camps can be positioned. The pure A-A-A, B-B-B, and C-C-C combinations would account for the typical philosophies about which any freshman learns: idealism, nominalism, and materialism. All systems of philosophy have a place within this schema, but none are complete alone. This suggests but doesn't necessarily imply the unity of all philosophies and a recycling of the lost older insights with the newly discovered and valid systems of thought. It does imply that there is ultimately a correct interpretation of universals, but such an interpretation exists in the context of learning there are "better" or "more correct" ways of understanding universals. Explicitly a universal can exist in many modes: as a pure abstract non-material entity, or as a symbol, or as a material object. This assertion would no doubt be met with the criticism that no one hypostasis could exist without at least a minuscule element of another hypostasis. This argument brings to mind the medieval Christian debates concerning the nature of their hypostases of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. One principle is asserted over another in respect to the different nature attributed to each hypostasis. One cannot have a valley without its opposite, the mountain. The criticism would state that no symbol could exist without some material element, no matter or object could exist without some ideal existence, no idea without some symbolic indicator. Likewise, one could reverse this criticism: no symbol can exist without some idea(l) element, no idea(l) without some matter, and no matter without some symbolic indicator. This leaves a tight hermetic system that allows for no change. An absolutist would be satisfied plugging all the possible philosophies into the schema I have laid out, but there are two factors that aren't included. These two elements are either 1) that which is not a pure hypostasis, a "trans-universal",⁶¹ but may be apprehended as something individual that does indeed exist or 2) that to which no universal applies. I allow these two obscure elements because of the inherent limitations of human waking consciousness. One should always allow for the unadulterated unknown. Looking at the Diagram on page 39, this unknown would exist either inside in the middle region or outside in the white parts of the page. In the center I would label it as the "trans-universal" area and outside the borders as simply "the unknown."

Section C: Synchronized Systems

The seed has germinated and now this thesis may bloom: synchronized systems of thought, placed within the correct context, don't become negations of other systems of thought, but rather coordinating factors in our understanding of reality. Put plainly, several descriptions of reality are correct not because a relativistic philosophy is a correct, mature one. They are correct because they are each addressing different needs. A doctor's explanation of a child's illness is just a correct as a mother's knowledge that her child is going through his or her first crush. A hydrological map and a topographical map are both correct but used for different needs and are based upon different assumptions. But what happens when outright conflicts occur between systems? Either a) one is correct and the other is not, or b) both are partially correct, or c) neither is correct. This is not something validated by logic alone because not all propositions and observations are known in any single moment and taken into account. All that exists in reality is in one synchronized system simply because each is in that set that contains all sets - reality. One would no doubt point out the tautological nature of the last statement, but if all must be revealed, this whole thesis has a tautological basis: I assume the existence of the very entities I wish to prove. But there is a big difference between a fool rushing into a barn to see if the bull is there and a doctor confirming a hypothesis about the use of medicine against disease. But how is one to approach an accurate validation of the Tables I have supplied? Ultimately this lies in the realm of the observer, whether it be the reader or the author. The technique I recommend is this:

Steps To Identifying Items While Using Universals

1) Suppose or hypothesize the unidentified item is either an object, symbol, or idea as based upon previous experience and understanding. Define the items as best as one can. Using intuition is perfectly allowable at this stage.
Example A: I see some kind of monument in Latvia and wonder what it is. I hypothesize it's symbolic.

Example B: I see an object underneath an electron microscope. It looks organic.

Example C: I am introduced to the concept of angels. It is asserted to be an abstract yet real entity - with personality!

Example D: An old friend comes to meet me with a pistol. He looks angry, but he is my friend. Something seems extremely wrong.

2) Review all possible facts, experiences, and understanding concerning the unknown.
Example A: I have no previous experience or knowledge of anything Latvian.

Example B: The specimen was collected from a rock found in Siberia deep in the snow near the remains of what was once an egg. Anthropological texts reveal that eggs were used as markers to fertility worshipping sites.

Example C: I know of only mythological references to angels and never had entertained the idea of the positive existence of such a creature.

Example D: I ask my friend what is wrong; he cocks the pistol, waving a huge bill and woman's underpants in the other hand.

3) Try to gather yet new information of the item through other objects, ideas, or symbols.
Example A: I read in a book that the monument was built after 1917 when war had etched itself into Latvian history. The monument depicts old Latvian. warriors that once fought the Crusaders, defending their families and land.

Example B: Frozen egg cells are found. Closer examination shows they are from a dinosaur egg. It also is not buried like a fertility egg would be. This object was known through other objects (the electron microscope) and symbols (anthropological data).

Example C: An exegesis of the word angel shows the varying status that angels are assigned in cultures admitting to them. Descriptions allow for the possibility of direct apperception of such a creature's existence through contemplation and/or meditation. This ideal being is better known through symbols in books or other ideas (an exegesis would look at semantic relationships).

Example D: I run to the police after a few shots, bleeding. I learn that my friend believes that I have done something horrible to him and he is very distraught. After he surrenders to the police, he learns who really victimized him and understands a new level to this tragedy. I forgive him, remembering what a good friend he had been in the past.

4) Affirm, confirm, or deny the original view. Synthesize, coordinated, analyze, and re-observe empirical data.
Example A: I see a Veteran's memorial for W.W.I. This symbol I better understood through other symbols as found in a book.

Example B: Dinosaurs once inhabited what is now frozen wastelands. This proves that weather was not always the same in the same territories

Example C: If definitions of angels are correct, unexplained events can be attributed to angels if they have positive meaningful effects and a distinct character self-evidently indicating a particular personality is present.

Example D: In this natural scenario, symbol, object and ideal are united; I am working to the ideal friend.

5) Repeat and repeat steps 1-4 until either enlightenment or happiness ensues.
Many more examples could exist, starting and ending with different combinations of the hypostases. One may not necessarily end in enlightenment or happiness through this process, but being a Socrates dissatisfied and with an ironic smile on one's lips is better than being a pig satisfied on the way to slaughter. But I will and do make the claim that I found an enlightenment of which Plotinus would have approved!